A tribunal is London has completed hearing of a dispute between the Keith Mitchell-led government in Grenada and U.S investor, Jack Grynberg on the future of a 1996 agreement to explore for oil and gas in Grenadian waters.

The ruling New National Party (NNP) government is accused by Grynberg of trying to ditch him for a group of Russians who have
reportedly given the administration a"grant" of US$2.5 million to fight the Colorado-based businessman.

Grynberg has filed a lawsuit in New York against deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Energy, Gregory Bowen and three Russians seeking US$500 million in compensation.

The London hearing will determine the future of the contract between Grynberg and the Mitchell government. Both Minister Bowen and Senior Energy Officer, John Auguste travelled to London to give evidence before the 3-member tribunal panel.

Last week, GRENADA TODAY reproduced Part 1 of a Witness Statement given to the tribunal by Auguste.

Following is the second and final part of that statement:

I disagree entirely with the way RSM and Mr. Grynberg have sought to portray the boundary negotiations between Grenada on the one hand and Venezuela and Trinidad & Tobago, on the other.

At the time he began his involvement with Grenada and its boundary delimitation exercise, Mr. Grynberg was unaware of the technical issues involved, or how the whole process was institutionalised and formalised.

Although he had experience and know-how in Geology and was given"Special Envoy" status"for the purpose of discussing issues related to petroleum resources" on this basis, at the time he appeared to be entirely unfamiliar with the basic concepts involved in boundary delimitation, such as what the median line or the continental shelf theory as a starting point meant, the history and substance of Venezuela's approach on these issues, and that Venezuela had not ratified the UNCLOS.

Mr. Grynberg seemed to think that since he supposedly had a friend in the Venezuelan government he needed only to whisper in the ear of the right person, and all doors would open for him. During his first contact with Venezuela in September 1996, he behaved inappropriately, giving out maps that he had drawn (and had not cleared with the government of Grenada).

And possibly also promising concessions, just so that he could try to get the boundary established in a manner that was favourable to his narrow interests. My opinion was that such informal meetings should be discouraged because they risked undermining the work of the official negotiation team.  

Mr. Grynberg's statements to the effect that it was really for Petrotrin on behalf of Trinidad & Tobago) and Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) on behalf of Venezuela to agree on a boundary is simply incorrect.

Even if Petrotrin had stated that it had no legal interest in a certain area, or whatever the representatives of PDVSA allegedly told Mr. Grynberg about their rights or interest (although knowing the approach of Venezuelan officials towards their"patrimonial rights" to the continental shelf, I find Mr. Grynberg's testimony on this issue highly implausible).

This does not mean that there was a boundary settled, or even that exploration could have proceeded unimpeded in the border area. The demarcation of boundaries is a matter to be decided by national governments, not national (or other) oil companies.

RSM is right in theory, that a boundary might have been achieved with Trinidad & Tobago, had the matter been properly brought before and decided by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). However, bringing an international claim against Trinidad & Tobago at the time would have had a number of negative consequences.

Our two nations have had excellent relations for decades. Trinidad and Tobago, is, like Grenada, a member of the CARICOM, and has at all times supported its neighbours. For example, we received significant assistance from them after hurricanes Ivan and Emily. There is thriving trade in agriculture between the countries on which many Grenadian farmers depend for their livelihood.

The links are also social, for example Grenadians send their children to school and university in Trinidad & Tobago. These are examples of the kinds of considerations that are of legitimate and serous concern to any Government in forming the context for boundary delimitation, but which RSM has no interest in and failed to take into account in the approach it took ostensibly on Grenada's behalf.

Thus even if the Government had decided that it would have been appropriate to initiate proceedings against Trinidad & Tobago, it certainly would not have been appropriate to let someone like Jack Grynberg be in charge of the claim. With Venezuela, the legal option would not have been available even in theory. Venezuela is not a party to UNCLOS (and hence has not agreed to ITLOS jurisdiction).

Venezuela has also made it clear that it has not consented to ICJ jurisdiction for this purpose. I am not aware of the basis of RSM's claim in the United States courts against PDVSA, but I am certain that Venezuela (and Grenada) would not have recognised the jurisdiction of a United States court to delimit the boundary between Grenada and Venezuela (particularly in a case to which neither state was a party).

As I have tried to explain before maritime boundary delimitation is a complex exercise with delicate issues involved - not all of them relating to the boundary itself. Both Venezuela and Trinidad & Tobago are much bigger and wealthier (and in the case of Venezuela, militarily more powerful) states than Grenada, which in itself faces some limits on what we can hope to achieve and the timeframe within which we can achieve it.

The early signs in the boundary delimitation effort were positive albeit not due to anything that RSM did. There were some promising preliminary diplomatic contacts with Venezuela in 1997, and formal negotiations commenced in 1998.

In particular, progress was made in several areas during the third round of negotiations held in 2001, despite the difficulty arising from Venezuela's continuing espousal of the continental shelf theory. Concerning Trinidad & Tobago, a first round of official boundary negotiations had been held in 1992 followed by a second round in 1994.

In 1996 there were new elections in Trinidad & Tobago. Despite of the arrival of a new Government with new priorities, the diplomatic signs received from Trinidad & Tobago in 1996-2000 indicted that they were willing to proceed with the negotiations. However, political events in both of these countries interfered with the process. When in Venezuela there was an attempted coup in 2002 and Trinidad & Tobago was in a period of constitutional crisis due to the 2000 and 2001 elections both resulting in a hung parliament.

This did not necessarily mean that there were to be no more negotiations, and indeed both states indicated that they would be willing to continue, but rather that the two countries would take time to deal with their domestic priorities first. Similarly, Grenada was in no position to conduct any negotiations in the period following hurricane Ivan in 2004.

Political agendas naturally develop over time as Venezuela's has, there have been signs recently that its aggressive attitude of the last few years towards the Caribbean nations is giving way to a more diplomatic approach which has opened up the expectation of resuming negotiations.

In short, the Government has at all times been in contact with officials from Venezuela and Trinidad & Tobago regarding the boundary negotiations, but such issues do not take place in a political vacuum. They require a sensitive approach, patience and diplomacy. Mr. Grynberg's"bull in a china shop" approach of threatening and starting litigation, far from advancing boundary delimitation, was in fact wholly counterproductive.

RSM'S ILLEGAL ENTRY INTO GRENADIAN WATERS

Mr. Grynberg is wrong in stating that I gave permission for the 2004 seismic survey in Grenada's waters by SS Admiral. During the telephone conversation we had in early February 2004 to which he refers in his second witness statement, I told him what the protocol was for applying for permission.

In particular, I told him that he needed to give the coordinates and timing of the proposed trip, name of the vessel and its captain so that the Fisheries Department could warn fishermen. Furthermore, I specifically told him that the position that the Government had taken in 2003 was still valid, but that he was of course free to apply for permission giving the details I specified.

He then wrote me a letter discussing the possibility of employing a chase boat for the trip. This letter mis-stated the position I had taken during our conversation, as discussed above. Mr. Grynberg later wrote a second letter stating that he would get the chase boat instead from St. Vincent. This alarmed me as it indicted that Mr. Grynberg might proceed without applying for permission.

I recall that I called the Coast Guard to warn them that an unauthorised boat might enter our waters. The vessel must have avoided the Coast Guard since I never heard about the trip again, until the Fisheries Department received complaints from local fishermen that the ship had destroyed their nets.

OTHER INACCURACIES

I also wish to comment briefly on two other topics: the work programme under article 6.1 of the Agreement; and the provision of seismic data.

Work Programme

Contrary to Mr. Grynberg's statement, I did not agree to the work programme RSM was to submit to the Government pursuant to Article 6.1 of the Agreement. After signature of the Agreement, there was never any conversation between us on the work programme. We had, however, discussed the proposed work programme under Article 4 of the Agreement on occasion during the negotiating process, but no agreement was reached during those conversations.

More importantly. Article 6.1 of the Agreement specifies that the work programme and budget should be detailed and submitted to the Minister in charge of energy. This was intended to enable the Government to appraise the reasonableness and sufficiency of what RSM was planning on doing and whether the budgeted amounts would have been sufficient to cover the planned activities. It is clear that an informal conversation of the kind alluded to by Mr. Grynberg would not have sufficed. RSM never submitted any written work programme.

SEISMIC DATA

As I stated before, Mr. Grynberg did not to my knowledge shoot any seismic lines in Grenadian waters in 1971. He might have participated in one of the regional studies that were undertaken and financed by others, such as UNDP, although I have no knowledge of his having participated.

During the negotiations for the Agreement, Mr. Flaxman was permitted to review all seismic data in our possession and after its signature we authorised him to obtain copies of available data from earlier studies. It is thus misleading to claim that RSM"procured" this data.

The only thing we asked for in return was for RSM to provide us with copies of what they obtained and reprocessed, so that we knew what they had. However, a trust issue emerged later, as a result of the miraculous discovery by Mr. Grynberg of a very important seismic map called the"C"map of a highly prospective area called the Caricolito High.

The"C" map had been missing since it had been prepared in the 1970s. Sometime in 2002 (I think), Mr. Grynberg telephoned me to inform me that the map had been located in the basement of the building in which his offices were housed.

I found that to be too much of a coincidence, especially since Mr. Grynberg said he had been involved in one of the studies in the 1970s and had always expressed a keen interest in Caricolito High.
As a result of the mistrust this engendered, we did not give him permission to obtain the seismic material stored in Barbados.