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| Minister Gregory Bowen |
The battle continues in a New York court between Grenada's Deputy Prime Minister, Gregory Bowen and oil giant, Jack Grynberg of RSM Production Corporation.
Grynberg has sued the island's Number Two man along with three Russians for US$500 million in connection with an oil and gas exploration deal that went sour in the Spice Isle.
The American has accused Bowen, the island's Minister of Agriculture and Energy of demanding a bribe from him in order to proceed with the agreement.
Minister Bowen has hit back in documents filed before the U.S court in which he accused Grynberg of being the stumbling block in negotiations between Grenada and its neighbours on maritime boundaries.
Last week, GRENADA TODAY published Part 1 of Bowen's witness statement to the New York court.
Following is Part 11:
Boundary Negotiations with Venezuela
I recall that in 1996, Mr. Grynberg sought to take a personal role in the negotiations with Venezuela, claiming that he had good political connections there.
In August 1996, he asked for permission from our Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be named an advisor to Grenada's negotiating team formed to hold boundary talks with Venezuela.
As the boundary negotiations had not yet started, and as the government had extremely limited past experience with such matters, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed to Mr. Grynberg's request.
I understand that Mr. Grynberg travelled to Caracas in September of 1996 to meet with Venezuela officials, accompanied by Grenada's ambassador to Venezuela, Mr. Fabian Redhead. This meeting did not lead to any result.
At about the same time, I personally assumed leadership of the Grenadian negotiating team with Venezuela. As the Foreign Ministry requested, we put Mr. Grynberg's name on our list of team members, which was transmitted to Venezuela prior to the negotiating session in May 1998.
The Venezuelan side objected, however, and asked us informally not to include Mr. Grynberg on our team. They apparently believed that his presence would hinder, rather than advance, negotiations.
I believe this was based on their negative perception of his past activities. Mr. Grynberg did not attend the May 1998 negotiating session.
I might add here that Venezuela has generally been quite aggressive in the positions it has taken on its maritime boundaries. The well-publicised dispute between Venezuela and her Caribbean neighbours regarding Bird Rock (isla de Aves) is one clear example of this.
Historically, Venezuela has taken the view that maritime boundaries should be determined based on geology - in other words, that all maritime space above its continental shelf belongs to it - and not on the concept of equitable median lines enshrined in the Law of the Sea Convention (which Venezuela has not signed or ratified).
The logical conclusion of this would be that Venezuela's boundary with Grenada would, in its view, extend well beyond the hypothetical median line. Naturally, Grenada rejects that view.
I might also usefully add a comment about Mr. Grynberg himself. In my experience, he is someone who likes to boast about his political connections. Indeed, I recall once receiving a letter from him in which he described his supposedly close relationship with the US Administration and enclosed a picture of himself with President George Bush.
At various times in the period 1998-2000, Mr. Grynberg wrote letters to the Prime Minister and to me, describing various contacts whom he claimed would be useful in resolving Grenada's boundary issues. Mostly these were US State Department officials who allegedly cold exert influence on Venezuela.
Over time, Mr. Grynberg's claims became less and less credible, not least because the relationship between the United States and Venezuela's President Chavez was noticeably souring during this period.
By the end of the year 2000 Mr. Grynberg's attempts to interpose himself in the sovereign negotiations between Venezuela and Grenada were causing substantial difficulties for us. This was a particularly important phase in the negotiations between the two countries.
In November 2000, our Prime Minister and President Chavez had stated publicly that the boundary should be delineated within a year. It was critical that this hoped-for result, the consequence of renewed political will on both sides, should not be disrupted by unwelcome interference from third parties.
My (and the Government's) frustration with Mr. Grynberg was of course further heightened by RSM's wholesale failure to do anything whatsoever to move forward with its oil exploration programme.
On 26 January 2001, I wrote to Mr. Grynberg and asked him to stay out of the negotiation process with Venezuela. I noted that "Venezuela wants no contact or involvement of any person except Grenada Government Officials in the boundary delimitation process with Grenada".
Nonetheless, over the course of the next three months, Mr. Grynberg continued to make contact with US officials apparently seeking their intervention in the Venezuela-Grenada relationship. I know this from letters sent to me by Mr. Grynberg describing these activities.
On 3 April 2001, I wrote to Mr. Grynberg again, reminding him of my request that he stay out of the negotiation process. As stated in my letter "the Republic of Venezuela is well aware of your trying to influence the process through certain channels and has exceedingly strong objections to your or any other participation.
I added that it was "clear that negotiations will not continue" ff Venezuela were to think that Grenada (through Mr. Grynberg) had gotten the US State Department involved in an effort to influence the process.
Apparently that was still not clear enough, because Mr. Grynberg's activities continued. I therefore wrote to him again, noting that "it appears that you still have not accepted the fact that your actions could lead to the discontinuation of negotiations. I do hope we can impress upon you the seriousness of the situation".
Still Mr. Grynberg did not cease his meddling. In April 2003, as he recites in his witness statement (at para 11). Mr. Grynberg went so far as to sue the Venezuelan national oil company, PdVSA, in US court. I am not aware of the claims made, although I understand that the suit essentially asked the US court to make decisions regarding the Grenada-Venezuela boundary. The suit was ultimately dismissed by the US Courts.
Not surprisingly, this action did nothing to improve the atmosphere in the ongoing intergovernmental negotiations between Venezuela and Grenada (especially as relations between Venezuela and the US had wholly soured by this time).
As to the state of those negotiations at present, I can only say that there has been essentially no progress since the 1990s. While useful talks have been held, the parties are still discussing the framework for setting the boundary, a preliminary step to Venezuela taking a formal position on what boundary line it views as proper.
I can safely say that Mr. Grynberg's actions have impeded rather than advanced a resolution. I can also say that any claim that Venezuela has agreed to a medium line is sadly mistaken.
Boundary Negotiations with Trinidad and Tobago
Mr. Grynberg rather brazenly writes in his witness statement that he "proceeded to resolve the maritime boundary dispute with Trinidad and Tobago" (para 12).
I accept that he interposed himself in the ongoing negotiations between the two countries. I strenuously deny that he advanced a resolution of the maritime issue, much less that he "resolved" it.
On 3 October 2002, Mr. Grynberg wrote to our Prime Minister, Dr. Mitchell, and announced that he would proceed to file for arbitration against Trinidad and Tobago before the UNCLOS tribunal in Hamburg ("ITLOS"), purportedly on Grenada's behalf. In fact, he had no permission from the Government to do so.
As Mr. Grynberg would later admit, he "took matters into his own hands. (About two months previously, he had threatened to sue both Trinidad and Tobago and Grenada before ICSID (though apparently he meant ITLOS) if we did not participate in a claim against Trinidad and Tobago).
On 9 October 2002, Mr. Grynberg's attorneys sent to Trinidad and Tobago, and others, a request for arbitration before the ITLOS issued in the name of the Government of Grenada.
Indeed it appears that Mr. Grynberg submitted with the request a sworn affidavit stating that RSM had the Government's permission to submit the request. This was false.
On 11 October 2002, Mr. Grynberg, apparently having been asked by ITLOS to prove that he had the Government's consent to proceed in its name, wrote to the Prime Minister seeking such consent. Needless to say, consent was not forthcoming. I am not aware of the ultimate fate of Mr. Grynberg's ITLOS arbitration request.
Mr. Grynberg's interferences did not stop there, however. On 31 January 2003, he wrote to the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, asserting that Petrotrin (the national oil company) had trespassed into Grenadian waters, and demanding the surrender of certain seismic data allegedly obtained by Petrotrin.
Once again, Mr. Grynberg claimed, wrongfully, to be acting on behalf of the Government of Grenada. Needless to say, such actions hindered rather than advanced relations between Grenada and Trinidad and Tobago.
As to the current status of negotiations between Grenada and Trinidad and Tobago, I can attest that the boundary remains to be demarcated, notwithstanding several official meetings between the two States.
To avoid any doubt on this issue, the Government asked Trinidad and Tobago to confirm their understanding of the current position, which they recently did.
Trespass by RSM into Grenada's Waters
In January 2003, Mr. Grynberg apparently instructed an English compnay called Thales to conduct seismic surveys in the waters of several Caribbean nations, including Grenada.
This was of course at a time when RSM claimed the Agreement with Grenada was in force majeure status, and had failed to take any material step to honour its contractual obligations, including the simple (and contractually required) expedient of applying for an Exploration License.
In the circumstances, the Government denied a request made by Thales to survey in Grenada's waters.
This prompted a polemic from Mr. Grynberg to the Prime Minister dated 28 February 2003. In his letter, Mr. Grynberg accused me of being "obstructionist" and essentially said that he would cause the ship to trespass into Grenadian waters not withstanding the lack of Governmental consent (and notwithstanding the fact that according to RSM's current claims, it was "impossible" at that time for them to engage in exploration activities due to force majeure).
I quote from his letter:
"I intend to bring a Russian seismic ship and conduct seismic work offshore Grenada, this year. The ship will also fly an American flag, because RSM is an American company and I have been assured by my State Department that I will have the protection of the United States Navy. But, most importantly, I will have this situation blown all over the world press because I have no other choice but to protect RSM's interests.
"The President of the United States, Mr. George W. Bush, has instructed America oil companies to find more oil and gas outside the Middle East. We intend to fulfill that order from my President and no one, especially not Minister Bowen is going to stop us"
And indeed Mr. Grynberg's ship did later enter Grenadian waters, destroying in the process fishermen's nets for which the Government has been obliged to undertake to pay.
I point out that this trespass constituted, among other things, a criminal offence under Grenada's Territorial Waters Act of 1978.
During this same time-frame, as I recall it, we learned that RSM had apparently "farmed out" rights under the Agreement to other companies.
According to the information we received, these were small Texas oil companies, one of which was called Devon Energy. Later reports suggested a further "farm out" to a Chinese oil company.
These reports heightened still more my and the Government's concern about RSM. Even assuming they had existing rights under the Agreement, the text of the Agreement prohibited assignments of rights without Grenada's consent.
Furthermore, these actions suggested that RSM was following the pattern that (as we had by then learned) Mr. Grynberg had used elsewhere: lock up territory, do no work (and spend no money), and then try to profit by selling off interests to third parties.
We became concerned that if RSM ever had any intention of carrying out its contracted obligations, it no longer did.
Situation at End 2003
As a result of the events described above, the Government was, by the end of 2003, extremely unhappy with RSM.
It had failed to take even a single meaningful step towards actually beginning an exploration programme, notwithstanding its promises in 1996 to proceed with expedition; it or its principals had inappropriately interfered in Grenada's relations with its neighbours on sensitive matters; RSM had shown itself willing to sue anyone, including sovereign States, on the flimsiest of pretexts; it had committed a trespass into Grenadian waters; and it appeared to be "farming out" interest in an exploration license it had never even applied for and did not have.
These circumstances brought me to the view, frankly, that Grenada was suffering as a result of RSM's actions and omissions.
Nonetheless, neither I nor the Government took any precipitous action. Rather, we instructed our lawyers to examine the Agreement and assess what our legal rights were.
Although we had substantially lost faith in RSM, they were in fact given a final chance to perform in accordance with the Agreement.
This occurred in January 2004, when RSM purported to revoke the force majeure event it had invoked in July 1996.
(To be continued)
