A report conducted into the operations of the royal Grenada Police Force (RGPF) has touched on the critical question of senior officers leaving their stations to be run only by juniors on weekends.

"The junior ranks voiced frustration at the unwillingness of their senior to work on weekends", said the report that was done by former Jamaica Police Commissioner, Trevor Mac Millian and experienced British police officer, Brian Reynolds.

In their report, Mac Millian and Reynolds said that this was very evident during their stint on the island when they visited stations as part of their assignments.

"The prevailing lack of leadership and sense of direction in the Force was demonstrated by the lack of presence of any senior Commander over the weekend that the consultants visited the territorial Commands", they said. "Most stations were commanded at Corporal level and only one Sergeant was found to be on duty", they added.

Following is the third and final part of the Mac Millian/Reynold Report on the performance of the local police force during the passage of Hurricane Ivan last September. It deals with the recommendations that should be looked at:

RECOMMENDATIONS

HURRICANE INSTRUCTIOINS:

(1). The current Hurricane Instructions must be renewed, updated and published. These instructions should also be written to dovetail with the National Disaster Plan.

(2). In the event of a total loss of communications, there should be an alternative i.e. Dispatch Riders, etc. This would do much to give direction and confidence to Commanders, particularly those in isolated positions.

(3). The Instructions must include a direction to all Divisional and Department Commanders to identify alternative command buildings to be used, as the need arises.

(4).. There are circumstances when it may be necessary to requisition motor vehicles and heavy equipment. The circumstances, the appropriate authority level, and class of vehicles should be clearly recorded. It may be advisable for the NaDMA to have authority to secure heavy equipment from the Private Sector in the absence of Government-owned equipment.

(5). The likelihood of looting being now a major concern should be clearly emphasized and addressed to all personnel.

(6). The proposed location of senior officers should be known and addressed in the Instructions.

(7). The Commissioner of Police should be located with NaDMA, whilst ACP Operations should be based at Force Headquarters.

(8). There must be an instruction directing Divisional and Departmental Commanders to give a report on their stations immediately after the hurricane. This report must also include the status of the communities in which they operate.

(9). The responsibility for the welfare of members of the RGPF must be given special attention, and a person or persons be assigned prior to the hurricane and until all operations cease.

(10). Following simulated exercises, a full debrief should be held and Minutes taken detailing any actions required. The instruction should be amended to reflect this practice.

(11). Prior to the commencement of the hurricane season, Divisional/Department Commanders should bring the Hurricane Instructions to the notice of all officers under his/her command and record details in the station/department diary. This requirement should be included in the instruction.

(12). Although the Hurricane Instruction (paragraph 4) requires all officers to report for duty 24 hours before a hurricane is expected to strike Grenada, under the Warning System, Phase 2, the recall of persons from leave should be included as a requirement.

(13). The instruction should direct all officers to make arrangements for their uniforms to be protected during the hurricane to ensure availability immediately after the blow.

(140. An additional instruction (currently 90) should be added to detail the requirement for a post-hurricane debrief.

OPERATING PROCEDURES:

(15). The preparedness section of the Force Hurricane Instruction must be rigidly adhered to, in particular the requirement to hold regular simulation exercises. It is further recommended that such exercises include the presence of independent umpires (i.e. NaDMA personnel)

(16). When simulation exercises are held, there should be a Force record of such and a report should be submitted to the Police Commissioner detailing any debrief recommendations.

(17). Post-simulation exercises and prior to the commencement of the hurricane season, the Assistant Commissioner of Police (Operations) should hold a briefing to be attended by all Divisional/Departmental Commanders detailing all hurricane operational requirements and updates. In turn, the Divisional/Departmental Commanders should then cascade this message to every member under their command.

(18). As soon as the expected weather conditions dictate that the Force should activate Phase 1 of the Hurricane Instruction warning system, the Assistant Commissioner (Operations) should brief his Divisional/ Departmental Commanders who in turn will brief their commands.

(19). In association with NaDMA, once Phase 2 of the Force Hurricane Warning System has been activated, the Police Commissioner should consider advising the public through the various media outlets of the law and order issues in respect of the passing of a hurricane.

(20). Once the Instruction Warning System has been activated, regardless of the outcome of the passage of the hurricane, a critical debrief should be held to test strengths and weaknesses of Police actions.

(21). Once a hurricane is forecast as imminent (i.e. Phase 4 of the Warning System - 6 hours to ETA) senior decision-makers should locate to the premises of the NaDMA should be chaired by The Prime Minister (or his nominee), and the Police representative should be The Commissioner of Police.
The Force should then be advised of the locations of both the Police Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner (Operations).

(22). In the immediate aftermath of the passage of the hurricane, the Assistant Commissioner (Operations) should advise the Police Commissioner of conditions reported country wide, or as far as is accessible.
The Police Commissioner should then advise the Chairman of the NaDMA to enable further actions to be considered (i.e. implementing a State of Emergency Instruction - if this action had not already been taken),

(23). In the event of conditions rendering a senior Police Commander unable to assume his/her command responsibilities, during any emergency operation, there should be a clear succession arrangement in being to ensure that the leadership of the force is not interrupted.

(24). In the aftermath of the passage of the hurricane, Divisional/Department Commanders should re-assess operational demands for their command and fully brief them accordingly. In the case of street patrols and dealing with members of public, the importance of wearing Police uniforms should be stressed.

(25). The requirement to quell public disorder must always take precedence over the arrest of minor looting offences, etc. However, Criminal Investigation Officers should consider securing evidence by technical means (cameras, etc) to enable them to pursue criminal investigations at the earliest possible time once public order has been restored.

(26). In association with the NaDMA, the Police should consider the use of the media in all its forms to advise the public of prevailing conditions, as soon as such action is technically possible.

(27). In the case of serious looting incidents, the Police should send all case papers to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecution to ensure transparency of prosecution.

(28). In any occurrence where outside law enforcement organisations are employed (i.e. RSS personnel, Overseas Defence Force, Overseas Security personnel), their deployment should be coordinated through the office of the NaDMA to avoid confusion regarding tasking and command responsibility.

(29). The Force should develop a succession plan, thereby ensuring that Officers with potential to reach the Commissioner ranks benefit from the necessary training, to include the management of major disasters.

GENERAL COMMENTS

At the time of the review some seven months have passed since the passage of Hurricane Ivan. There was no evidence that during that period the Force had conducted a full analytical review of failure of policing actions whist dealing with the aftermath of the hurricane.

Such action would enable a new Order to be written to prepare the Force for the oncoming hurricane season (only a few weeks away). In general conversation with members of the Force there were indications that the Force is ill-prepared for any other major emergencies (i.e earthquake, tsunami, airport disaster, etc).

There is an urgent requirement to address these deficiencies and to end the apparent air of complacency currently evident at senior level in the Force. To ensure that there are personnel suitably capable of being trained to eventually assume senior-rank responsibility, it is imperative that the quality of personnel being recruited initially be of highest level of integrity and intellectual capability.

The prevailing lack of leadership and sense of direction in the Force was demonstrated by the lack of presence of any senior Commander over the weekend that the consultants visited the territorial Commands. Most stations were commanded at Corporal level and only one Sergeant was found to be on duty. The junior ranks voiced frustration at the unwillingness of their senior to work on weekends.

A combination of the nation's complacency, devastation suffered during the hurricane and the hesitancy of leadership combined to adequately describe the circumstances that led to post Hurricane Ivan confusion.