The report of a two-man military team that was commissioned to investigate the operations of the royal Grenada Police Force (RGPF) during last September's passage of Hurricane Ivan has finally been laid in parliament.

A copy of the report obtained by GRENADA TODAY concluded that there was "great dissatisfaction by the public with the performance of police officers during Ivan. "It was widely contended that the Police under-performed to a significant extent", the report said.

The team comprised of British Police Officer, Brian Reynolds who served at one time as Commissioner of Police in St. Kitts and Colonel Trevor MacMillan, a former Commissioner of Police in Jamaica.

The investigators visited a number of police stations and interviewed a number of key persons in the country including new National Security Minister, Major Einstein Louison and Opposition Leader Tillman Thomas and businessmen, Andrew Bierzynski, Edwin and Donald De Caul, and Cedric Mitchell.

As a Public Service, GRENADA TODAY has decided to reproduce the report as submitted by the investigators.

Following is Part 1 of the series:

A document entitled 'Royal Grenada Police Force - Hurricane Instructions' was produced to the consultants as the sole Force Order relative to Police action as a consequence of the passage of a hurricane.

It has not been possible to accurately date the production of this document. However, it is safe to record that it was probably written at least ten (10) years ago and has never been updated.

Accepting that no Police Order can hope to capture every circumstance that may be encountered to determine relative actions when dealing with a hurricane, there are a number of omissions the consultants consider as apparent.

(i) The Order assumes that some forms of communication will be maintained during and after the path of a hurricane. Reference is only made to repairs and to communication systems. An acknowledgement of total communication systems failure and actions to be adopted following such an occurrence would do much to give direction and confidence to commanders, particularly those in isolated positions.

(ii) With the exception of four stations mentioned the Hurricane Instructions, the Order fails to direct divisional and department commanders to identify alternative command buildings should their normal stations/department buildings become unserviceable for any reason during or after a hurricane.

(iii) No consideration is made for the requisition of motor vehicles if the need arises

(iv) Much publicity, in recent years, has been given to the problem of serious looting following a hurricane. The current Order merely refers to anti-looting under the instructions addressed to the Special Service Unit (SSU).

(v) No mention is made of the relationship to NERO. The consultants were advised that a National Disaster Plan was being prepared by the National Emergency Relief Organisation (NERO); now renamed The National Disaster Management Agency NDMA).

(vi) The expected locations of senior commanders should be known and has not been addressed in the order.

(vii) There is no order for Divisions and Departments to report their status immediately after the Hurricane that would include the status of the communities.

(viii) There is no mention of welfare of personnel

In light of those plans and also bearing in mind standard operating procedures, to examine the response of all units, divisions and departments of the Royal Grenada Police Force immediately prior to and in the initial aftermath of the passage of Hurricane Ivan.

Apart from the previously-identified shortcomings of the Police operational order in respect of hurricane, the document was still a reasonable Order upon which to base a plan of action once Hurricane Ivan had been identified as a potential threat to the Island of Grenada.

The introduction to the Order identifies the official hurricane season for the region (1st June - 30th November, with August-October being the peak activity period), and that same page directs that simulation exercises will be staged in May and June of each year, on dates to be specified by ACP Operations (Maurice Darius) , to test operational readiness and procedural knowledge.

There appears to be no official record to identify the last occasion when a simulated exercise was conducted. Certainly there have been a number of years since such action was taken, and most certainly no thought was given to any exercises for 2004 season.

ACP (Operations) thought that exercise had been held in 1997 and that communications were tested in either 2002 0r 2003. It is, however worth reflecting on the Police action just one month before Hurricane Ivan, when the Island faced a possible threat from the passage of Hurricane Charley.

It appears that little was done at all by the Police by way of any preparation. On this occasion there were no repercussions. Charley passed Grenada at storm strength - a number of trees were downed and some roads blocked - and no external criticism was made of the lack of Police preparedness.

Regardless of the timely reminder Hurricane Charley should have registered with the senior command of the Grenada Police, still no preparedness action was initiated.
As the weekend of 4th/5th September progressed, there was a wealth of media/computer information available regarding the passage of Hurricane Ivan.

Certainly there is much evidence of the staff of NERO and individual Police Officers bringing to notice the potential danger of the path of the hurricane in relation to the threat to Grenada.

A number of Police Officers interviewed spoke of discussion with the Commissioner and other members of the Commissioner ranks regarding the path of the hurricane during Monday, 6th September 2004 and being met by a wall of complacency.
Comments such as "God will look after Grenada: and "The hurricane will veer, they always do" were made, and it is quite obvious that no thought of Police action was even being contemplated throughout most of that day by the Commissioner.

On the same day that ACP (Operations) had attended a meeting with the NERO staff to discuss the approach of Hurricane Ivan, the Government had declared a half-day holiday to allow the public to prepare for the storm.

Yet no real action was taken to prepare the Force for the challenges it might face should the hurricane touch Grenada. The Force Order in respect of hurricanes describes a phased warning system to be broadcast by Force Operations Room, warning of the approach of a hurricane/severe weather system. None of these advisory phases were ever authorized, highlighting the mindset of the Chief Officers at that time

It was not until Tuesday, 7th September 2004 that some action and direction was given at Chief Officer level. A meeting had been held by NERO, chaired by the Permanent Secretary, and attended by ACP (Operations) concerning the approaching hurricane and firm predictions that Grenada laid right in the path of hurricane.

When interviewed by the consultants, the Commissioner claimed he was never aware that the hurricane had the potential to seriously affect Grenada until six hours before the actual hurricane arrived.

Even when he was so advised, the information given to him was that if the hurricane hit Grenada it would not arrive until about 2:00 a.m. the following morning (8th September). This assertion conflicts with all other versions given regarding the advice passed to the Commissioner. A possible explanation for the Commissioner's version will be commented upon later in this report.

An instruction - never put into writing - went out to the Force during the morning of 7th September 2004 directing all officers to prepare for the hurricane: to secure their homes, settle their families, and to report for duty no later than 4:00 p.m. that same day.

The Commissioner has commented that he never gave the possibility of looting a passing thought. The omission is surprising, given recent hurricane experiences regionally in the last few years and Grenada's history of looting experiences in 1974, 1979,1983 and 1992. No radio/television broadcasts were made to the public regarding advice from the Police.

The full force of the hurricane struck Grenada at 2:00 p.m. that day. It was the first hurricane to do so for forty-nine years. None of Grenada's Police Officers had ever experienced a hurricane during their service, and perhaps the complacent attitude of officers can be understood by these facts alone.

The resultant damage from the hurricane was enormous with over ninety percent of the Island's housing stock and buildings damaged and most roads totally impassable owing to fallen trees and debris.

Many buildings had lost their roofs, to include the prison. Two hundred prison inmates had escaped during the night and a number commenced looting from shops and business premises as soon as they reached the town (St. George's).

Later many other persons engaged in looting, and general disorder resulted. The hurricane had taken out the communications ability of the Police Force, leaving all stations and departments isolated. The immediate aftermath of the hurricane found the Commissioner and ACP (Operations) at Police Headquarters, with the other three Chief Officers marooned at their homes and unable to reach their place of duty.

This was also the case for many Police officers who had been instructed to return to duty at 4:00 p.m. and had been caught out by the 2:00 p.m. hurricane - arrival. With so many Police Officers unavailable for duty at their stations/departments, there were inadequate numbers to perform the numerous tasks required to be undertaken.

The Commissioner's version that he thought the hurricane would come in the night may be an excuse for the order he gave which resulted in so many officers not being in a position to report for duty. For the first forty-eight hours following the hurricane it appeared that the Force was practically leaderless. The Commissioner appeared to many to be over-whelmed and unsure of himself and looking for political direction.

It took some time before the ACP (Operations) was able to organise himself and eventually relocated to the SSU compound. The Deputy Commissioner (James Clarkson) managed to reach Police Headquarters during the Wednesday afternoon but was sent home again to look after his invalid wife.

ACP (Willan) Thompson reached Headquarters on the Thursday afternoon, and ACP (Winston) James on the Friday morning. The two ACPs were later dispatched to assist Eastern/Western divisional commands.